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Majority rule
James Mendelsohn explains why the numbers game is so important in limited companies. But
there are several exceptions that allow minority shareholders to take their grievances to court
‘MAJORITY RULE’ underpins company law. 
At director level, board resolutions are passed
by a simple majority. At shareholder level,
ordinary resolutions are passed by a simple
majority, special resolutions by a 75% vote. 
In each case, a dissenting director or
shareholder is bound: ‘those who take
interests in companies limited by shares have
to accept majority rule’ (per Lord Wilberforce
in Re Kong Thai Sawmill [1978] 2 MLJ 277). 
The rule in Foss v Harbottle
Where a company is wronged, the company
itself should seek the remedy, not a member.
In Foss v Harbottle [1843] 2 Hare 461,
directors who allegedly misapplied company
property and entered illegal transactions were
sued by two members ‘on behalf of
themselves and all other members other than
the directors’. 
The court dismissed the action as there
was nothing to prevent the company from
taking the action if it desired (the ‘proper
claimant’ principle). Individual members may
not bring an action where the company can
settle an alleged wrong itself (‘the internal
management principle’), nor where a
company can ratify or condone an irregularity
by its own internal procedures (‘the
irregularity principle’). These rules cause
difficulties to aggrieved minority
shareholders: wrongdoing directors will
hardly mandate the company to take action
against themselves. 
Derivative claims
Various exceptions to these rules developed,
allowing individual shareholders to bring
actions in certain circumstances – most
significantly, where a fraud was perpetrated
on the minority and the wrongdoers were in
control. In Cook v Deeks [1916] 1 AC 554,
the company’s four shareholders were also all
directors. 
Three of the four diverted a company
contract to themselves, excluding the fourth,
and then passed an ordinary resolution
purporting to waive the company’s interest 
in that contract. The fourth member was
allowed to bring a ‘derivative action’ against
them, deriving from the company’s right to
sue, seeking relief on behalf of the company. 
Statutory derivative procedure 
Sections 260-264 of the Companies Act (CA)
2006 create a statutory procedure for a
member to bring a ‘derivative claim’ on the
company’s behalf. Claims may be brought in
respect of causes of action arising from an
actual or proposed act or omission involving
negligence, default, breach of duty or breach
of trust by a director. 
The court must give the member
permission to continue such a claim and
considers various factors, including whether
the cause of action has been authorised or
ratified by the company, whether the
member is acting in good faith, or whether a
person seeking to promote the company’s
success would bring such a claim.
Oppression and unfair prejudice
Since the rule in Foss v Harbottle caused such
difficulties, section 210 of the CA 1948 was
created, allowing aggrieved minorities to
petition the court for relief from ‘oppression’.
This was difficult to prove; only two cases
succeeded in 32 years. It was replaced with
what is now sections 994-996 of the CA
2006, allowing shareholders to petition the
court for relief where ‘the company’s affairs
are being or have been conducted in a
manner which is unfairly prejudicial’ to their
interests. 
The court assesses whether the conduct
complained of breaches the company’s
articles. Often, the articles will not reflect all
of the understandings between shareholders
– for example, that all shareholders should
also be directors – and thus the court also
ascertains whether any such ‘legitimate
expectations’ have been breached (Re Saul D
Harrison & Sons plc [1995] 1 BCLC 94 (CA);
O’Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 WLR 1092 (HL)). 
The courts have granted relief to minority
shareholders in various situations, for
example where no dividend has been paid
(Re Sam Weller & Sons Ltd [1990] Ch 682);
exclusion from management (Richards v
Lundy [1999] BCC 786); and gross
mismanagement by the directors (Re Macro
(Ipswich) Ltd [1994] 2 BCLC 354). Many 
cases involve ‘quasi-partnerships’ – small
companies where all members share
management responsibilities and profits. 
The court ‘may make such order as it thinks
fit’ (section 996(1)); usually, the wrongdoing
majority is ordered to purchase the petitioner’s
shares at a price fixed by the court. In order to
minimise costs, conflicting shareholders should
therefore seek to negotiate such a buy-out
before petitioning the court under section 994. 
Winding-up
Sections 122(1)(g) and 124 of the Insolvency
Act 1986 allow a member to petition the
court to wind the company up if this is ‘just
and equitable’. Orders have been made
where, for example, there is complete
management deadlock (Re Yenidje Tobacco
Co [1916] 2 Ch 246); or where the directors
are shown to lack integrity (Loch v John
Blackwood Ltd [1924] AC 783). Clearly, this is
a remedy of last resort, though the threat of
this and other actions may be used in an
attempt to improve any settlement.
Practical considerations
Normally, shareholders are bound by the
principle of majority rule, and may not bring
individual actions where the company has
been wronged. Where the company has been
wronged and the wrongdoers are in control,
a minority shareholder may bring a derivative
action on behalf of the company under
sections 260-264 of the CA 2006. 
Where a member has suffered ‘unfair
prejudice’, he may seek relief under sections
994-996 of the CA 2006, though preferably
only after seeking a negotiated buy-out. As a
last resort, he may petition the court to wind
up the company on the ‘just and equitable’
ground under sections 122(1)(g) and 124 of
the Insolvency Act 1986. 
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